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Abstract: Might architecture be reconceived as an art that is performed? David
Davies’s performance theory claims that all artworks should be considered not as
products made by generative performances, but rather as performances themselves.
But is architecture, like music, a ‘performed work’ in Davies’s terminology? Davies
thinks not, characterising architecture’s ‘executory performance’ as internal to gen-
erating an artistic vehicle associated with a physical object. By contrast, I contend
that architectural notation performs a dual role: an executory function (facilitating
construction) and a role in articulating an artistic statement (thereby establishing
its status as art). Here, the architectural ‘score’ is recast not as a mere ‘constraint’
but as integral to the creative processes by which architecture establishes an ‘artis-
tic statement’ and a distinctive ‘virtual’ realm. I test this position against a late
work by Sigurd Lewerentz, arguing that his idiosyncratic imperative not to cut
any bricks articulates an artwork every bit as radical as contemporaneous works
by conceptual artists.
The brickwork is the first thing one notices when visiting Sigurd Lewerentz’s
Church of Sankt Petri, located in the small town of Klippan in Skåne, Swe-
den (fig. 1). The hard Helsingborg bricks are used for walls, floors, vaulted
ceilings, fixed furniture and the altar (figs. 2, 3). Not only are the intrinsic
material qualities of the hand-picked bricks exemplified through their ubiq-
uitous use, but the bricks and mortar form a tactile continuous surface. As
the architectural critic Peter Blundell Jones writes, the walls are made with
wide, uneven joints, such that ‘[t]he pointing is not raked or trowelled as
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Figure 1: Sigurd Lewerentz, Church of Sankt Petri, west facade
usual but “bagged off”, crudely wiped with an old sack, causing the bricks
to be smeared’.1 Lewerentz instructed his bricklayers not to clean up – to
work in a ‘messier’ way than they were accustomed to. This does not imply
imprecision: Lewerentz would frequently ask for brickwork to be redone if
it failed to meet his exacting demands. Rather, it gives the walls a texture
reminiscent of local rural architecture. Yet as Blundell Jones continues (fig.
4):
From time to time this texture is relieved by another in acute
contrast: a pure semi-reflective plane of glass with a perfect silver
edge, evidently applied to the outside of the wall. Its delicate
form is held in position by the crudest means: a bracket in each
corner secured with two screws. This window in St Peter’s Church
Klippan, by Sigurd Lewerentz, is a favourite with architects, for
once seen it is never forgotten; but it is only imitated by the
brave.2
From the inside, looking out, it is as though there is no frame or glass.
From the outside, at certain times of the day the unframed windows, with
their radiant silver edges, take on reflective properties at striking odds with
the tactility of the smeared brickwork.
As memorable as these windows are, they are eclipsed by Lewerentz’s
idiosyncratic rule that might be said to have necessitated their invention.
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Figure 2: Rooflight details
There is no architectural precedent for his dictate that ‘no brick be cut’. The
only exception is the altar, the floor surrounding the altar, and the pulpit,
where a half-brick is used, but split, counterintuitively – and with difficulty –
lengthways. Lewerentz’s rule is neither a rational nor functional imperative,
and at times leads to some odd solutions (fig. 2). The exceptionally wide
and irregular horizontals required the mortar to be reinforced with ground
slate to give them a concrete-like strength; their width is partly accidental,
in that the wrong bricks arrived on site, Lewerentz having initially worked
out dimensions on the basis of a larger module that was not available in the
chosen brick.3 As Blundell Jones notes, ‘[t]he effect is often crude and messy,
almost shockingly so in places, and carried through with utter ruthlessness’.4
But this is testament to the extraordinary lengths that Lewerentz went to in
order to resolve the three-dimensional puzzle he sets himself at every junc-
tion. It required an almost daily presence on site and an intense working
relationship with the foreman Carl Sjöholm, with frequent modifications re-
quiring additional drawings. The notoriously reticent Lewerentz, who was in
his eighties when the building was completed in 1966, was silent about an
imposition that no ordinary client would have countenanced (though even
the Lutherans who commissioned Lewerentz grew frustrated at the delays).
Fortunately, we have access to some of the copious detail drawings gener-
ated by Lewerentz and his assistant Michel Papadoupolos, necessitated by a
rule, which – in choreographing every brick – far exceed any constructional
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necessity. That so many of these drawings were completed after the initial
construction phases underlines the improvisational nature of the performance
of Lewerentz’s ‘score’. And as we shall see, the most explicit revealing of was
not even part of the original design. A later amendment, the rule evolved
after much of the structure was completed, it is central to the extraordinary
way function and symbol intersect in Lewerentz’s architecture.
Figure 3: The altar
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the more ‘stable’ art forms, architecture presents particular difficul-
ties in categorising it as an art that is ‘performed’. Not least, not all buildings
are works of art; as Nelson Goodman states: ‘A building is a work of art only
insofar as it signifies, means, refers, symbolises in some way’.5 But even when
architecture functions as art (or, better, an architectural practice functions
as an art practice), there is the problem of locating who – or what – is doing
the performing. Architecture, necessarily, is a collective (even adversarial)
enterprise; not only is it a ‘two-stage’ art, involving design and construction
stages, but its overlapping phases of production can last months, or even
years.6 Such regulated processes of production involve mediation by many
hands, most of which do not bear upon the building’s status as artwork. Of
course, this ‘executory’ feature is not unique to architecture; it is something
architecture shares with other complex two-stage art forms, such as opera and
theatre. Nevertheless, operatic and theatrical performances are distinguished
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by being – uncontroversially – performance events, typically ‘live’ and con-
strained by a score or script. They are but one of a class of performances, such
that the identification of the work can be distinguished from each instance
of its staging. As Susanne Langer puts it, they are occurrent arts.7 By con-
trast, architecture lacks such occurrence, in that even when replicated, as a
constructed ‘thing in the world’ architecture remains ‘durable and physically
present’.8
Given this enduring physical presence, it is not surprising that what archi-
tectural theorist Stan Allen labels the ‘conservative’ position locates aesthetic
meaning solely in the experience of the building as built.9 In philosophical
terms, this is consistent with an aesthetic empiricism (as characterised by
Gregory Currie and David Davies) that in its ‘enlightened’ form proposes
that the primary factor in fixing the artistic properties of an artwork is the
immediate – albeit suitably informed – experience of the work as realised.10
Now a performance theory of art, such as that proposed by Davies in his
2004 book Art as Performance, sets itself up against such an empiricist view
where ‘artistic value is essentially a matter of the kind of experience elicited
in us through such an experiential encounter’.11 Davies’s contention is not
only that such accounts are found wanting when faced with the diversity of
contemporary art practices (often denying their status as art), but that they
misrepresent what is going on in traditional art. Problems arise for the em-
piricist view ‘when we consider how our beliefs about the history of making
of an object bear upon the appreciation of, and the ascription of artistic value
to, the work we take to be in some sense embodied in that object’.12 Davies,
by contrast, proposes the ontological claim that all artworks – including ar-
chitecture – be identified with the actions or processes that produced them
rather than their vehicles or products. The artwork just is the act of speci-
fying a focus of appreciation, thus articulating a content that comprises not
just the vehicle itself, but related contextual information and a set of shared
understandings – an ‘artistic medium’ – by which the vehicle expresses such
content.
Putting to one side criticisms of Davies’s theory, and whether its insights
might be accommodated within the remit of the aesthetic contextualism he
critiques, let us grant the feasibility of his argument.13 So how might such a
performance theory be applied to architecture? This question is complicated
by Richard Wollheim’s observation that ‘it is debatable to what [ontological]
category [architecture’s] works belongs’, in that it is not always clear whether
buildings are ‘individuals’ or ‘types’.14 Are they to be taken as physical objects
(like paintings and carved sculptures) or structure-types (like novels, poems,
and musical works)? This has consequences for answering what is and what is
not aesthetically relevant to a work of architecture: ‘Are the building materi-
als, or the hidden methods of construction, or the site, or the finish, essential
properties of the work of architecture, or are they merely properties of this
or that building which happens to instantiate the work as a token does a
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This confusion of category also has consequences for Wollheim’s ‘criticism
as retrieval’.16 Indeed, Davies brings out something of the difference in where
we must look to retrieve a work’s creative processes: ‘if, like Wollheim, we
take artworks to be essentially contextualized entities whose appreciation is a
matter, inter alia, of “retrieval” whereby we locate the artwork in its history
of making’, then with an ‘individual’ work a copy will not count as an instance
of the work because unlike an original painting it lacks this embedded history
of making; this is to be contrasted with ‘types’, where an ‘epistemic’ instance
can stand independently of how it came to have certain manifest properties,
such that each performance event can be treated as ‘ “equally legitimate”
renditions of a given artwork’.17 We do not measure a performance against
‘established performances of a musical or theatrical work in order to tell
whether it is a manifestation of the work’:18
In music, we can again distinguish between those manifestations of
the work that stand in an appropriate causal-intentional relation
to the prescriptive act of the composer and those that do not. But
while we have a historical link between certain manifestations and
the compositional activity of the composer, it is the score that
guides the performers, and not the performances themselves, that
plays the role [of constituting a history of making that bears upon
attempts at ‘retrieval’].19
Here, repeatability is built into the ‘work concept’, despite its existing ‘inde-
pendently of its particular performances’.20 And for Davies, the work, thus
considered, is a ‘piece of human invention “initiating” the work, where this
act of initiation is embedded in a historically and culturally specific set of
performative and appreciative practices’.21
So, given its use of notation, might an architectural ‘score’ (digital or
analogue dimensioned/notated plans, sections, elevations, plus scaled projec-
tions) likewise be conceived as just such a piece of human invention? Any
attempt to answer this question in light of a performance theory of art is hin-
dered by the fact that Davies’s own position on architecture remains unclear.
The highly mediated nature of architectural construction would appear to
rule out a straightforward analogy with his construal of individual paintings
or sculptures as ‘event-like’ entities. These are typically generated by a single
artist, such as Agnes Martin’s Falling Blue (1963) with its dense grid of lines
acting as an indexical trace of Martin’s generative performance.22 And yet,
in one of only two references to architecture in Art as Performance, Davies
refers to architecture’s ‘executory “performance” ’ as being ‘internal to the
process of generating the artistic vehicle’, something he claims it shares with
film.23 With film, however, the executory performance – encompassing many
creative and technical processes – generates a production artefact that is a
precondition for its multiple tokens (i.e. the screenings of the film).24 With
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architecture the implication is that the executory performance generates an
artistic vehicle that is taken as a physical object in a ‘process analogous to
the one whereby early Renaissance paintings were produced by artists work-
ing under the supervision of a principal artist and to the specifications of one
who commissioned the painting’.25
If this is a correct reading of Davies, then his notion of the executory per-
formance of architecture is contrasted not only to film (with its production
artefact), but to performance-events typical of the performed arts ‘that are
performances of performed works [such as Hamlet, Swan Lake, and Elgar’s
Cello Concerto]’.26 For instance, a musical composition, like any other art-
work, constitutes ‘a generative performance’, but one that must be completed
by a focus of appreciation external to this generative act: i.e. a performance
of the work. The difference is worth pursuing. Given that ‘many of the prop-
erties of a dramatic or musical work relevant to its appreciation are properties
only realized through performances of the work, what the artist produces must
bear in some essential way on these performances’.27 For Davies (distinguish-
ing his position from Goodman’s notoriously tight constraints on a ‘correct’
performance), a legitimate performance must be consistent not only with the
score, but other ‘non-explicit understandings as to how the [. . . ] score is to
be interpreted for the purposes of performance of the work’.28
Such a relation between performance and score is not something that
Davies appears to consider for architecture. In allocating architecture’s ex-
ecutory performance to the generation of the physical vehicle the work of ar-
chitecture is not considered one of a class of performances (nor even a single
performance) that mediates our appreciation of a performed work – associ-
ated with the design – standing independently of this realisation. While the
vehicular medium might be conceived as encompassing various processes by
which physical material is manipulated through the construction processes,
Davies emphasises the executory enacting of specifications over any notion
of interpretation of an architectural ‘score’. But, as Davies would no doubt
acknowledge, this raises the question of how the constraints represented by
architecture’s sophisticated notational system enter into the identity of the
work.
So where does this leave us? While Davies emphasises the generative pro-
cesses of the artefact rather than its artefactuality, the upshot is to regard
architecture’s design processes as normative conditions of a work’s construc-
tion. And yet such a position has long been contested within architectural
education. As Allen notes in his 1989 essay ‘Mapping the Unmappable: On
Notation’:
In both recent and more distant history, there have been those
who claim that the sense of a work of architecture, like music or
poetry, resides in the design rather than in the realised building.
The architect’s intentions, they argue, are expressed in their most
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direct form through notation, set down once and for all in the
abstract geometries of the drawing. In this view, architecture can
only be diminished by the exigencies of construction, compromised
by the complexity of the realisation and the unpredictability of
reality.29
For Allen, such an ‘experimental position’ faces the problem of locating ar-
chitectural practice on the ‘slippery ground of representation’.30 Nevertheless,
Allen reminds us that with architecture the history of making must encom-
pass both the ‘speculative’ processes of design and the ‘material’ practices
that transform matter into built form ‘through the intermediary of abstract
codes such as notation, projection or calculation’.31
And here, we might note a similarity between Allen’s argument and Davies’s
claim that ‘[t]o appreciate works as Wollheimean types is just to appreciate
what was done in two senses: (1) it is to appreciate what manifest properties
can be possessed by right tokens [. . . ] having the relevant causal history,
and (2) it is to appreciate what was done in establishing the preconditions
(for example, the generation of a production-artefact [as with film] or the
composition of a score) for that causal history to take place’.32 So one won-
ders why, given its compliance with a notational system, Davies does not at
least consider architecture a ‘performed work’ (which, as we shall see in the
next section, Goodman contemplates – though not unequivocally). Indeed,
as Goodman notes, the fact that ‘the compliance-class of a set of [architec-
tural] plans happens so often to consist of but one building’ is ontologically
beside the point since architectural works can be both single or multiple
(typical of housing).33 In either case it is the ‘score’ – along with non-explicit
shared understandings embedded within architectural practice – that deter-
mines legitimate instances of the work. Davies, however, appears to share
Wollheim’s doubts about categorising architecture as a type (if not the lat-
ter’s stipulation that every work belonging to the same art should belong to
the same category).34 However, as we shall see in the next section, on at least
one definition of Goodman’s well-known distinction between autographic and
allographic arts, an allographic work might in some circumstances be cat-
egorised as an individual work rather than a type. This recasts Goodman’s
distinction not in terms of categorising the various arts, but in terms of differ-
ent histories of production that recognise architecture’s distinctive two-stage
process. To appreciate an individual work of architecture is also just to ap-
preciate what was done in two senses: (1) it is to appreciate what manifest
properties can be possessed by a physical vehicle having the relevant causal
history (in circumstances such as where an unrepeatable performance medi-
ates our appreciation of a performed work, or an architectural intervention
into a unique piece of existing architecture), and (2) it is to appreciate what
was done in establishing the preconditions (the architectural ‘score’) for that
causal history to take place.
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Whether repeatable or not, I want to argue that an appropriate causal-
intentional relation to the creative act of the architect(s) as artist(s) is thus,
at least in certain circumstances, mediated through something akin to the in-
terpretation of a notational score in music (rather than merely an ‘executory’
performance).35 And such circumstances, I want to argue are the very ones
where we tend to regard the work of architecture as a work of art, or better
yet, the product of an architectural practice functioning as an art practice.
Lewerentz’s Sankt Petri, with its combination of in situ improvisations and
excess notations is one such example.
Indeed, one might even think that this interpretation of architectural no-
tation operates as a kind of excess to the executory role architectural nota-
tion undoubtedly plays – an excess that facilitates, for instance, a Goodma-
nian notion of exemplification, whether literal or metaphoric.36 Given that
many of the aesthetic properties of architecture relevant to its appreciation
are properties only realised through its construction and subsequent use, we
might say that the focus of appreciation here oscillates between its notation
and the realised structure, with the former crucial to articulating an artistic
statement and, hence, establishing its status as art. Architectural notation,
thus conceived, performs parallel functions: it facilitates (1) the physical re-
alisation of an architectural object that fulfils contractual obligations and
‘primary functions’ and (2) what Timothy Binkley (more about him later)
refers to as indexed acts of ‘piece-specification’, whereby sets of meanings or
values are conferred upon objects or structures.37 And as with music – and,
even more so, with dance – the relation between notation and performance
varies. While architectural notations are rarely considered pure improvisa-
tion or improvisational composition, one can readily conceive of equivalences
to Davies’s categories of improvisational interpretation (one might think of
the ‘self-build houses’ based on Walter Segal’s modular construction system
as offering a framework for improvisation).
However, there is something amiss here. A consideration of Lewerentz’s
building highlights the one-sidedness of Davies’s wider performance theory of
art. Although he acknowledges circumstances where ‘a physical engagement
with the vehicle is necessary in order to determine what is being articulated’,
he largely omits the consideration of the situatedness of the encounter that
context-dependent artworks afford.38 I will therefore attempt to reconcile in-
sights afforded a performance theory with an aesthetics of reception, whereby
the situated encounter with the physical building is seen as essential not only
to the critical retrieval of any given architectural performance, but to how the
building choreographs the beholder’s movement through space (as remarked
upon by Goodman). Here, the performative activity of the beholder involves
orientating herself (using embedded cues) towards both built reality – crucial
not only to the building’s primary functioning but to the appreciation of the
work’s construction and siting – and the artwork as ‘semblance’. Architectural
‘scores’ are vital to the work’s critical retrieval. Moreover, they cannot be re-
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cast as mere ‘constraints’ to the processes of construction (as with Goodman’s
emphasis on a compliance class of objects), since they are integral to the very
creative processes by which architecture establishes an ‘artistic statement’ (in
Davies’s sense) and a distinctive ‘virtual’ realm (in Langer’s sense).39 Con-
stituting a set of instructions, they establish a necessary relation between the
organising ‘idea’ and the manipulation of a physical medium by leaving ‘a
trace on the construction’.40 The architectural score thus constitutes an act
of indexing in a double sense: it performs a locative function in orientating us
towards the building (and its virtual realm), whereby we might retrieve the
creative processes of its history of making and experience its choreographed
spaces; but it also fixes an architectural practice as an art practice.
II. REVISITING THE ALLOGRAPHIC/AUTOGRAPHIC
DISTINCTION
How might this dual role for architectural notation be reconciled with Good-
man’s allographic/autographic distinction? This was first introduced in Lan-
guages of Art in relation to the issue of forgery:
‘Let us speak of a work as autographic if and only if the distinction
between original and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and
only if even the most exact duplication of it does not thereby count
as genuine’.41
This definition is refined in a later version in Of Mind and Other Matters,
where Goodman states: ‘What distinguishes an allographic work is that iden-
tification of an object or event as an instance of the work depends not at all
upon how or when or by whom that object or event was produced.’42 In
other words, the specific history of production must be considered in a sin-
gular work such as Martin’s Falling Blue, though in the case of Elgar’s Cello
Concerto’s multiple instances, it is not. Accordingly, even a lacklustre perfor-
mance counts as an authentic instance, provided it complies with its score.
In Languages of Art, however, Goodman introduces a second definition,
distinguishing between allographic arts involving some form of notation (a
score or a script) such as music, dance and drama, and autographic arts,
such as painting and sculpture, which typically do not.43 Jerrold Levinson
challenges Goodman’s view that the two definitions are extensionally equiv-
alent, arguing that they do not coincide because of ‘a simple consequence of
the failure of any existing artwork to be notationally identifiable’.44 Levinson
contends that poems and musical compositions:
turn out to be just as historically tethered as paintings, prints,
and sculptures. The difference is not, contra Goodman, that ‘his-
tory of production’ is irrelevant to genuineness in the former arts.
How a copy or performance has come about is as relevant to its
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authenticity as the provenance of an impression is to its belong-
ing to a given print. The difference is rather that, in poetry and
music, the notationality of structure permits genuine duplication
without theoretical limit, and secondly, the origination conditions
for genuineness are hardly ever in question and so are easily –
though mistakenly – overlooked.45
Figure 5: The vaulted roof structure
Levinson is not arguing that notationality does not mark an important
difference among the arts. Instead, he puts forward an alternative defini-
tion of the allographic/autographic distinction where we distinguish works
of art as autographic iff ‘the identity of genuine instances of the work is
not at all determined by identity of character in a notation or compliance
with a character in a notation’.46 By contrast, ‘in allographic arts, identity is
partially determined notationally, and directly transcribed duplicates can be
genuine’.47 Levinson’s realignment of the allographic/autographic distinction
has important consequences for architecture, which under Levinson’s defini-
tion must be thought of as an allographic art. But let us first consider how
Goodman himself characterises architecture as an anomalous or ‘mixed’ case.
In his brief discussion of architecture in Languages of Art, Goodman con-
cedes that the particular combination of drawing and text, numerals and
symbols of the architectural plan potentially ‘counts as a digital diagram and
as a score’.48 They are not mere sketches (autographic representations) or
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scripts but notational instructions for the construction of a building that can
potentially be repeated elsewhere. Hence, Goodman concedes that architec-
ture might justifiably be categorised as allographic, since its notational system
could potentially be used to replicate buildings, and is therefore capable of
multiple instances. As noted earlier (but to expand the citation), Goodman
argues:
We must not be misled by the fact that the compliance-class of
a set of plans happens so often to consist of but one building;
or by the preeminent interest or value that a given instance of
an architectural work may have; or by the emphasis sometimes
laid upon immediate supervision, by the architect, of the process
of construction [something we have encountered with Lewerentz].
Many a composition is played only once; and a building or perfor-
mance executed under the direction of the designer or composer,
while a more personal product and perhaps much better (or much
worse) than another building or performance from the same plans
or score, is not therefore a more authentic or original instance of
the work.49
Nonetheless, Goodman concludes that ‘the work of architecture is not al-
ways as surely disengaged from a particular building as is a work of music
from a particular performance’.50 Not least, as we have seen there are works
of architecture that, perhaps because of their site-specificity, or their partic-
ular circumstances of production, cannot be repeated without constituting a
‘copy’. Some works of architecture, such as unit housing, might therefore be
considered truly allographic (subject to repetition), while, at least according
to Goodman, some are autographic (because their particular history of pro-
duction is tied not just to the ‘score’ but to an unrepeatable constructional
event). Thus, for Goodman, we are ‘not as comfortable about identifying
an architectural work with a design rather than a building as we are about
identifying a musical work with a composition rather than a performance’;
therefore, architecture, ‘insofar as its notational language has not yet ac-
quired full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from particular
production’, is ‘a mixed and transitional case’.51
But what if we adopt Levinson’s revised definition instead? With allo-
graphic arts such as music, not only is identity only partially determined
notationally, but such a categorisation reflects established conventions of mu-
sical practice. By extension, this might therefore be said to be true of archi-
tecture, where compliance with notation is likewise historically tethered (not
least in terms of viability of historic construction techniques). On Levinson’s
definition, architecture cannot be autographic (though it might integrate au-
tographic elements) given that its identity is, at least partially, determined
by the legitimate compliance with architectural plans. Just as some prints
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are categorised as autographic, even though they are also types, works of ar-
chitecture, whether types or individual works, might (like performances) be
categorised as allographic. But such an argument becomes more convincing
if we shift the discussion away from issues of identity to a consideration of
the practice of architecture
III. TOWARDS A PERFORMANCE THEORY OF
ARCHITECTURE
Despite any criticism of Davies’s notion of architecture’s executory perfor-
mance, his wider performance theory of art offers two correctives to Good-
man’s account of architecture. Indeed, Davies grounds at least part of his
theory of art as performance on aspects of Goodman’s argument. This is not
surprising, given that ‘Goodman argues that arthood is not so much a matter
of what a thing is – what properties it possesses – as of what a thing does, the
function that it performs in a given context’.52 For Davies, this sense that an
artwork’s status ‘is something that an object possesses only when it functions
as a symbol of a certain kind’ distinguishes Goodman’s position from other
functionalist definitions which ‘tend to classify things in terms of how they
usually function, or how they were designed to function’.53 And Goodman
explicitly applies this to architecture, when he writes: ‘A building is a work of
art only insofar as it signifies, means, refers, symbolizes in some way’.54 And
the primary way Goodman argues that architecture symbolises is by exempli-
fication.55 When a work of architecture refers, it does so relative to properties
exemplified in the sense of being typical of, or epitomising, certain features
– such as an exemplar of a structural system, material or spatial typology.
If possession is intrinsic, then this kind of reference, by being exemplary of
how such properties are integrated into a replete architectural system, is not.
And thus, by virtue of functioning as a symbol by exemplifying such gathered
properties, a work of architecture functions as a work of art.56
But for Davies, symbolic functions are neither performed independently of
a work’s history of making nor independently of a background of shared un-
derstandings. Goodman’s position fails to acknowledge that art is essentially
institutional; however, for Davies, institutional must be categorised in the
right way. He maintains that a performance ‘articulates a content through
a vehicle via an “artistic medium”’, a term Davies uses to describe ‘a sys-
tem of articulatory understandings in a system of the artworld, in something
like Danto’s sense’.57 Rejecting ‘institutional theory’ definitions of ‘the Art-
world’, which describe a broad social institution conferring the status of an
‘artefact’ as art, Davies asserts that an artistic medium is a set of shared
understandings ‘in virtue of which the manipulation of a vehicular medium
may issue in a vehicle which articulates a content in virtue of functioning as
an “aesthetic” symbolic in something like Goodman’s sense’.58 This recasts
Goodman’s account not as
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providing conditions under which we have an artwork, but as pro-
viding conditions under which a practice of making counts as a
practice of artistic making. So construed, what Goodman clari-
fies is the conditions under which a set of shared understandings
counts as an artistic medium, so that vehicles generated by agents
who rely upon those understandings in articulating a content are
rightly taken to articulate artistic statements.59
Davies denies that – unlike Goodman’s unreconstructed position – this
constitutes a functionalist definition of an artwork, stating that ‘something
is an artwork in virtue of its being an articulative performance that takes
place within such a system [of the artworld], not in terms of functioning as an
“aesthetic symbol” to a greater sense than things which are not artworks’.60 In
other words, Davies distinguishes those functions conferred upon an artwork
independently of its history of making from the symbolic functions integral
to the articulation of an artistic statement within the context of such a set of
shared understandings. He therefore proposes a ‘procedural’ definition, but
one that conceives of the notion of ‘institutional’ in a broad way, embodied
in actual practices and a community of receivers.61 And usefully for my
own position, it potentially ties Goodman’s notion of exemplification – the
primary way architecture means – to the articulation of an artistic statement
as manifest by the architectural ‘score’.
Here, we might again reference Binkley, who refers to works of art as
indexed acts of ‘piece-specification’.62 Davies states that for Binkley ‘[p]iece-
specification is intensional, because what are specified as pieces are not ob-
jects or structures per se, but sets of meanings or values conferred upon ob-
jects or structures through the very act of piece-specification’.63 These mean-
ings are dependent upon historical circumstances, and someone like Donald
Judd – author of 1965 essay ‘Specific Objects’ – evolves radically new ways of
working. Davies adopts Binkley’s claim that ‘[w]hat counts as a work of art
must be discovered by examining the practice of art’, in that, like philosophy,
art ‘is a cultural phenomenon, and any particular work of art must rely heav-
ily upon its artistic and cultural context in communicating its meaning’.64
For Binkley, an artwork just ‘is a piece indexed within conventions of this
practice, and its being an artwork is determined not by its properties, but
by its location in the artworld’.65 The properties do not confer an indexed
piece’s status as artwork, but they are used to say what the work is in that
‘[t]o make a work of art is to use a medium to join together literal physical
qualities and created aesthetic qualities’.66 But importantly it is the artist’s –
not the institution’s – activity or performance that is relevant; while this ad-
mits works in the Duchampian tradition that are deliberately non-aesthetic,
‘[t]he tools of indexing are the languages of ideas, even when the ideas are
aesthetic’.67
Thus conceived, architectural notation is likewise not just a means to
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transform plans and sections into built reality, but the means to evolve a
practice of architecture that might legitimately count as a practice of artistic
making. Moreover, as Allen suggests, architectural notations leave tangible
traces on the construction, the residue of spatial/temporal relations that while
virtual (they cannot necessarily be directly perceived but only inferred) in-
form our perceptual experience of the resulting architecture; as Allen states,
‘[i]n the passage from drawing to building, the real and the virtual will al-
ways be present in some unpredictable mixture’.68 This is not to deny that
architectural drawings cannot, in their own right, be the focus of apprecia-
tion. Indeed, unrealised projects play a key part in the history of architecture,
such as Mies van der Rohe’s seminal 1924 drawing of a brick country house.
I rather aim to emphasise architectural notation’s role in blending ‘artistic
statement’ and a distinctive ‘virtual’ realm. Unlike paintings, architectural
drawings are, as Allen suggests, ‘neither an end in themselves [. . . ] nor are
they simply transparent technical instruments’.69 And crucially, it is the artis-
tic vehicle itself that affords cues as to the role an ambulant beholder must
play in retrieving such a generative performance. This is consistent with
what I have argued elsewhere as the locative function of art, which provides
‘indexical cues as to the position the beholder must adopt in order to place
herself in the requisite experiential connection to the work’s meaning’.70 But
while a factor in all art, it is particularly pertinent to architecture, which, as
Goodman notes, cannot be perceived as a whole, but requires the receiver to
move, sequentially, through its ‘choreographed’ internal and external spaces
(relying on memory and imagination to orientate ourselves).
My main point is that there are different performances at play here, en-
acted through the work’s two stages of production (constrained, but also fa-
cilitated by the detailed drawings and instructions of the architectural score),
and enacted by the beholder: the latter conceived both as a spatially-situated
retrieval of the creative process, and a performance choreographed by the ar-
chitecture, whereby the beholder orientates himself/herself towards the work
as both functional object and ‘semblance’. As the appropriate artistic vehicle,
it is the performed building itself that offers cues as to how the beholder might
‘complete’ the work through her anticipated and activated presence; never-
theless, it is the residue of the originating architectural score – constructing
spatial relations experienced across separated spaces – that establishes archi-
tecture’s distinctive virtual realm.
IV. THE BEHOLDER’S PERFORMANCE
Lewerentz was an important forerunner of Brutalism. Outside of Sweden,
his work was championed by Reyner Banham, author of the 1966 The New
Brutalism.71 However, as Colin St. John Wilson notes, this designation of
Lewerentz as a proto-Brutalist contains only a half truth, in that this intensely
private architect was driven not by association with any group or manifesto,
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Figure 6: Gutter detail on east facade of Parish offices
but by the internal necessity of the available resources. According to St.
John Wilson, ‘What for lesser mortals is called “detail” was for him a means
of heightening and transfiguring the day-to-day’.72 Lewerentz is therefore
an ideal candidate to explore Goodman’s notion of exemplification as an
intensification of properties possessed. In so doing, Lewerentz transfigures
ostensibly ordinary details, nowhere more manifest than the sets of meanings
or values conferred upon that most ubiquitous of objects, the brick.
As noted earlier, Lewerentz and Papadoupolos produced copious detail
drawings, which in fixing the position of every brick far exceeded any con-
structional necessity. Not only is Lewerentz’s rule about uncut bricks manifest
in the way the building looks, but it is made apparent in such a manner as
to reveal the constitutive role of the ‘performance’ of this rule. Here, exem-
plification, as possession (of certain properties) plus reference, is not merely
a question of the intrinsic properties of the bricks (i.e. possession without
reference), but how these properties are made visible through their juxtapo-
sition as individual units within a ‘sea’ of mortar. Through both drawing
and improvisation on site, such properties are made apparent in such a way
that at every junction we are forced to reflect upon the three-dimensional
resolution to the problem Lewerentz’s instruction presents (fig. 2), prompting
acts of ideation in a way that most brick buildings simply do not.73 Here,
bricks symbolise in such a way as to not only exemplify the inherent material
and structural properties, through an intensification prompted by their ubiq-
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uitous use, but to emphasise the very process of the structure’s rule-bound
constructional logic.
I want to argue that this constitutes a performed work involving both
interpretation and improvisation. As Janne Ahlin notes:
Lewerentz’ drawings were a story unto themselves. Many revisions
and explanatory drawings reached the contractors office. They
were not easy to understand, and Lewerentz had to instruct fur-
ther as to how they were to be read.74
Importantly, such acts of piece-specification encompass not only what is
said, or specified, but what is left unstated or unexplained. This compels
the beholder to find connections and relations for what is intentionally dis-
connected, through acts of ideation constrained by the work. Writing on
literature, Wolfgang Iser claims that the ‘iconic signs of literature constitute
an organisation of signifiers which do not serve to designate a signified ob-
ject, but instead designate instructions for the production of the signified’.75
The recipient’s ideational, performative activity is thus prescribed within the
work, but only comes to full fruition through the recipient’s imagination. As
Iser notes, ‘it is the recipient’s performance that endows the semblance with
its sense of reality’.76 With architecture, that performance is both enacted
and choreographed by the architecture and the critical retrieval of its history
of production.
What counts as a work of art is therefore discovered not only through
recovering the ‘practice’ of its construction – how the building exemplifies its
own inherent structural logic – but the decision making and wider associa-
tional images this imparts. Goodman likewise claims that exemplification of
structure, in particular, makes visible the ‘build’ of the building.77 Lewer-
entz’s Church of Sankt Petri is exemplary in this regard, allying its structural
solution to various aspects of liturgy. This is manifest in the extraordinary
structural solution to the church’s square plan. Unlike the linear basilica form
of Lewerentz’s earlier Markuskyrkan, Sankt Petri responds to the principle
of an open circle (reminiscent of the early church), where the congregation
surrounds the performance of the sacraments. Faced with the problem of how
to span the space with his desired brick vaults, Lewerentz utilised a doubled-
up steel T-shape column, that in turn supports two doubled-up cross beams
that hold up the complex roof of irregular sloping brick vaults. Colin St.
John Wilson refers to their subtle undulations as metaphoric of the rise and
fall of the breath (fig. 5).78 Out of structural necessity, Lewerentz devised a
novel solution that in its associations fuses literal and metaphorical exempli-
fication. As St. John Wilson notes, this demonstrates a ‘strange instinct by
which Lewerentz, apparently concerned only with a dogged working-out of an




Figure 7: ‘where the language of water and brick poetically coincide.’ (p. 47)
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This transformation of ordinary architectural detail is also echoed in Lew-
erentz’s handling of water run-off, another ostensibly functional problem
raised to the level of performance – made visible in the final architecture.
There is an astonishing diversity of solutions adopted, where the pragmatic
requirement to throw off water (an obsession apparent in Lewerentz’s wider
oeuvre) is transformed into something extraordinary (fig. 6). But there is one
feature of the interior of the church where the language of water and brick
poetically coincide (fig. 7). As Blundell Jones writes, ‘the baptismal trough at
the corner where one enters [is] a primeval slot, a water-filled fissure, the edge
of which swells up mysteriously’.80 Blundell Jones is absolutely right to use
the verb to ‘swell’, implying, as it does, a process apparently still in progress.
Lewerentz here enacted an extraordinary blend of metaphor, symbol and ev-
eryday pragmatics. An improvisational design solution that deviated from
the working plans, Lewerentz was reputedly inspired by the story in Exo-
dus 17:6, where Moses is instructed to smite a rock with his staff and water
emerges out of the resulting fissure. The pool continues, unseen, under the
raised mound of bricks. The giant tropical shell that acts as a font, which is
incidentally a feature of other Lutheran churches, makes explicit reference to
early Christian representations showing Christ baptised by John the Baptist
with a scallop shell, and the continuous double drip of this constantly filling
and overflowing shell permeates the darkened space. As Blundell Jones notes:
‘Baptism is the resounding theme: the space of the church is cave-like and
intimate, more sanctuary than celebration, a place of deep mystery rather
than stark protestant clarity’.81 And yet the dripping water is supplied not
by an elegant spout, but by a shockingly functional copper tube, strapped
to the steel frame that supports the large shell. Again, the day-to-day is
transfigured in such a way as to provoke associations that unite symbol with
utilitarian solution, expression with literal exemplification. And in opening
up this fissure within the ground, the bricks incongruously protruding out
at either end, Lewerentz reveals – in its most explicit manifestation – the
rule about uncut bricks, almost as if the idiosyncratic rule applied to the
entire building was designed for this one moment of revelation as the ground
beneath our feet metaphorically opens up.82
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NOTES
1Blundell Jones 2002, 159.
2Blundell Jones 2002, 159.
3Ahlin 1987, 167.






10Currie 1989, Davies 2004. For a par-
tial defence of a moderate version of aes-














22See Wilder 2020, ch. 9.
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24Davies 2018, 62.
25Davies 2004, 232. Davies uses this
analogy with respect to a Damien Hirst
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35Here, right interpretation is taken as
a precise discrimination of the higher-
order symbolic functions performed, such
as formal (exemplificational) and expres-




39Langer refers to architecture’s mode
of virtuality as an ‘ethnic domain’, but
this is far the least developed of her ac-
counts of art’s various modes of semblance.
She also uses the term ‘atmosphere’, which
might usefully be reconciled with a dom-

















55Not all properties are literally pos-
sessed, in that they may be possessed
metaphorically. However, Goodman dis-
tinguishes between properties that, while
literally false, are metaphorically true –
such as the Gothic cathedral that ‘soars’ –
and those that are metaphorically false –
the Gothic cathedral that ‘droops’. Good-
man 1985, 646.
56Of course, Goodman recognises that
works of architecture also symbolise by
more complex, mediated chains of refer-
ence. Goodman here references Robert
Venturi, where exemplification of juxta-
posed forms can even give rise to contra-
dictory architectural references that delib-
erately set out to contravene each other.
Such mediated reference can therefore
involve both ‘homogeneous and hetero-
geneous chains of elementary referential
links’, and perhaps even – through direct
quotation – depiction. Goodman 1985,
648.
57Davies 2004, 253. See, also, Danto
1964.








65Binkley 1977, 276. Of course, the ‘art-
world’ with regard to architecture is a very








72St. John Wilson 2001, 112.
73The latter is demonstrated by discrep-








78St. John Wilson 2001, 122.
79St. John Wilson 2001, 120.
80Blundell Jones 2002, 166.
81Blundell Jones 2002, 166.
82I am grateful to Sue Spaid, and two
anonymous reviewers, for forcing me to
clarify my position. One reviewer offered
the intriguing suggestion of developing Pe-
ter Eisenman’s notion of architectural ob-
jects as ‘unfolding events’, which space has
not allowed me to do. As the reviewer
suggested, such an alternative strain of
scholarship would certainly dovetail with
Davies’s sense of the essential ‘eventful-
ness’ of object-based art. I am also grate-
ful to comments by audience members (in-
cluding David Davies) at two presenta-
tions of earlier iterations of the paper,
given at the ESA and BJA annual confer-
ences. In 2017, I was commissioned to pro-
duce a sound/light installation at Sankt
Petri, in collaboration with Aaron Mc-
Peake: https://vimeo.com/238958284.
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